Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 57

Issue 3

Article 5

Summer 6-1-2000

The Implications of Daubert for Economic Evidence in Antitrust
Cases
Roger D. Blair
Jill Boylston Herndon

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Evidence Commons, and the Science and
Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Roger D. Blair and Jill Boylston Herndon, The Implications of Daubert for Economic Evidence in
Antitrust Cases, 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 801 (2000).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol57/iss3/5
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

The Implications of Daubert for
Economic Evidence in Antitrust Cases
Roger D. Blair'
Jill Boylston Hemdon**

Table of Contents
I. Introduction .......................................
I. Daubert'sStandards ................................
A. Factual Background inDaubert ....................
B. The DaubertCriteria ............................
1. Relevancy .................................
2. Reliability .................................
3. The Court's "General Observations" ............
C. The Kumho Clarification .........................
D. Implications of the "Gatekeeper" Role ................
I. Daubert Challenges and Summary Judgment ..............
IV. Inferences of Collusion and DaubertChallenges ...........
A. Tacit Collusion .................................
B. The Antitrust Enforcement Dilemma .................
C. Introducing "Plus Factors" ........................
D. City of Tuscaloosa: An Example ...................
E. Evaluating Expert Testimony ......................
V. Concluding Remarks ................................

801
802
802
804
805
805
806
807
809
814
817
818
820
821
823
827
829

I. Introduction
The Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.' has caused an upheaval in the presentation of expert testimony
on economic matters in antitrust cases.' As with most major decisions, our
*
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1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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understanding of Daubertwill evolve as we gain experience through future
litigation. In the meantime, Daubert challenges to the admissibility of the
economic expert's testimony already are becoming routine in antitrust cases?
The impetus for such challenges is clear: The returns of a successful Daubert
challenge are quite substantial. In antitrust cases, the potential return of a
Daubert challenge is especially pronounced
because Section 4 of the Clayton
4
Act provides for treble damages.
Consider the consequences if a court strikes a plaintiff's economic
expert: The plaintiff would have no one to define relevant markets, to analyze
antitrust injury, or to provide damage estimates. Without expert testimony on
these issues, the plaintiff's case may evaporate. Likewise, if the court strikes
a defendant's expert witness, then the defendant would have no one to testify
on those very same issues. Given the potential benefits of having expert
testimony stricken, it is not surprising to see so many Daubert challenges.
The resulting mini-trials, in which both direct and cross examination of expert
testimony are put on for the judge, obviously add to the cost of litigation. But
these efforts are necessary if our understanding of the boundaries of expert
testimony under Daubertis to evolve.
Our focus in this paper is twofold. First, we will explore the confusion
that Daubert,and more recently Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, have created
regarding the standards for the admissibility of expert testimony and those for
summary judgment.6 Subsequently, we will examine an area of antitrust that
may be particularly affected by Daubertand Kumho: inferences of collusion
based on economic evidence.
ff. Daubert's Standards
A. FactualBackground in Daubert
In Daubertv. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., the plaintiffs - children born with birth defects and their parents - alleged that Merrell Dow's
3. One result of these challenges is the dehiand for more specific support for every statement in expert reports. For example, an expert report of some 100 pages or so may contain over
500 footnotes in support of virtually every idea expressed.
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1998) (allowing "threefold" recovery of damages sustained).
5. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). In Kumho, the Supreme Court refined its views on the admissibility of expert testimony. See Kuniho Tire, Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,141 (concluding
that Daubert applies to "testimony based on 'technical' and 'other specialized' knowledge"
(citing FED. R. EVID. 702)).
6. See PHELIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAWP, ANTraRUST LAW 322.1 (Supp.
2000) (discussing judicial control of expert testimony); see also Andrew L GavilAfter Daubert:
Discerning the Increasingly Fine Line Between the Admissibility and Sufficiency of Expert
Testimony in AntiOst Litigation, 65 ANITRUST L.J. 663, 669-98 (1997) (examining impact
of recent Supreme Court cases on economic testimony in antitrust cases).
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antinausea drug for expectant mothers, Bendectin, caused birth defects? The
defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that there was no
evidence that Bendectin caused human birth defects This contention was
supported by the defendant's expert, a physician and epidemiologist, who
reviewed the existing published studies on Bendectin and found no indication
that the drug caused human birth defects? The plaintiffs rebutted this argument with expert testimony of their own. A team of eight experts conducted
a "reanalysis" of previously published human studies. In effect, they performed their own analyses ofthe data employed in previous studies.' 0 Relying
onthese "reanalyses" and on published test tube and animal studies that found
a connection between Bendectin and malformations, the plaintiffs' experts
concluded that Bendectin can cause birth defects."
Despite the evidence offered by the plaintiffs' experts, the district court
granted summary judgment to the defendant. 2 More specifically, the court
found that the evidence offered by the plaintiffs did not meet the "general
acceptance" standard for expert testimony. 3 First, the court ruledthat conclusions based on non-epidemiological evidence did not meet this standard given
the large amount of epidemiological information available.14 Second, the
court ruled that the "reanalyses" did not meet the standard because they had
not been subjected to peer review.'" On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. 6 In doing so, it cited Frye v.
United States,17 which set forth the "general acceptance" standard for the
admissibility of expert testimony.' But when the Daubertplaintiffs brought
7.

See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582 (describing factual allegations).

8. Id.
9.

Id.

10.
11.
12.

Id. at 583.
Id.
Id.

13.
14.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 583-84 (citation omitted).

15.

Id. at 84 (citation omitted).

16.

Id. at 584 (citation omitted).

17.
18.

293 F. 1013 (1923).
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 584 (1993) (discussing

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals's opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d
1128,1129-30 (1991) (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923))). TheFrye
test refers to a 1923 decision regarding the admissibility of a blood pressure deception test,
which was an early lie detector test. In that case, the court of appeals refused to admit this test

on the basis that, "while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from

a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thingfrom which the deduction is made
must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in

which it belongs." See id. at 586 (citing Frye, 293 F. at 1014) (emphasis added). Thus, the
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their case before the Supreme Court, the Court found that the Federal Rules
of Evidence superseded Frye and thus remanded the case for further consideration.' 9
B. The Daubert Criteria

The Federal Rules of Evidence - and Rule 70220 in particular - guided
the Supreme Court's ruling in Daubert.2" In its interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the Court repeatedly emphasized two points concerning
the Rules' standards for admissibility of evidence. First, the Court noted the
flexibility of the Rules' standards.' Second, the Court explained that the
Rules' standards are significantly more relaxed than the "general acceptance"
standard set forth in Frye23 The Court noted that "[tlhe drafting history [of
the Rules of Evidence] makes no mention of Frye."'24 Furthermore, "a rigid
'general acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of
the Federal Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing the traditional
barriers to "opinion" testimony."'25 But the Court also noted that this more
relaxed standard does not mean that there are no limits on the admissibility of
expert evidence, nor does it prevent the trial judge from screening that evidence. 2 6 Indeed, the Court observed that Rule 702 "clearly contemplates some
degree of regulation of the subjects and theories about which an expert may
testify."27 The Court further indicated that it is the trial judge's responsibility
to "ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not
only relevant, but reliable. ' 28 Thus, the Court identified two key criteria for
evaluating expert testimony: relevancy and reliability.

Frye test came to be known as the "general acceptance" test for determining the admissibility
of scientific evidence.
19. Id. at 587,597-98.
20. Rule 702 states, in relevant part "Ifscientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
21. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-92 (interpreting rule).
22. Id. at 587-89.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 588.
25. Id. (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988) (citing FED.
R. EVID.701-705)).
26. Id. at 589.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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1. Relevancy
The Court observed that Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
defines relevant evidence "as that which has 'any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.""
Thus, the Court noted that Rule 702's requirement that expert evidence or
testimony must "'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue' ... goes primarily to relevance."3 0 Not surprisingly,
no matter how proficient the expert and no matter how meticulous the analysis, the evidence offered must shed insight into the issue at hand.3
2. Reliability
The Court's discussion regarding the reliability of the proffered evidence
focused on the meaning of the phrase "scientific knowledge."3' 2 The Court
explained that "It]he adjective 'scientific' implies a grounding in the methods
and procedures of science. Similarly, the word 'knowledge' connotes more
than subjective belief or unsupported speculation."33 The Court further
explained that "[i]n order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or
assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must
be supported by appropriate validation .... In short, the requirement that an
expert's testimony pertain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a standardof
evidentiary reliability."34 In the broader context, one could reasonably infer
that for those areas that are not categorized as "scientific" in nature, an expert's testimony must be grounded in the methods and procedures of his or her
discipline and must not be speculative in nature. The Court further explained
thatthe rationale behind granting expert witnesses a greater degree of freedom
(relative to other witnesses) to offer testimony on matters about which they do
not have firsthand knowledge "is premised on an assumption that the expert's
opinion will5 have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his
3
discipline.
29. Id. at 587 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 401).
30. Id. at 591 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
31. See id. at 591-92 (noting that knowledge must assist trier of fact).
32. The nature of the issues in Daubert focused the Court's attention on "scientific,"
rather than "technical" or "other specialized" knowledge. But the Court did note that Rule 702
also applied to "'technical, or other specialized knowledge.'" Id. at 590 n.8 (quoting FED. R.
EVID. 702).
33. Id. at 590.
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 592 (emphasis added).
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Thus, the Court clearly mandated that expert testimony must meet a
reliability standard if it is to be admitted. But this reliability standard may be
a challenging one to meet and to assess because it involves evaluating the
appropriateness with which experts employ discipline-specific methodology.
3. The Court's "GeneralObservations"
To determine whether evidence is sufficiently relevant and reliable, the
Court offered the following five general factors that a trial judge may consider
in determining the admissibility of expert evidence:
36
1. "whether a theory or technique... can be (and has been) tested,"
2. "whether the theory
or technique has been subjected to peer review
37
and publication,"
3. "the known or potential rate of error" of a particular technique,38
4. "the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation, 3 9 and
5. the extent to which the theory or technique has gained acceptance
within the relevant scientific community.'

With respect to the last factor, which is a "general acceptance" benchmark, the
Court noted that "[w]idespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling
particular evidence admissible, and 'a known technique which has been able
to attract only minimal 41support within the community,' may properly be
viewed with skepticism."
In light of the Court's repeated emphasis that the Federal Rules of
Evidence permit flexibility in determining the admissibility of expert testimony, a trial court's inquiry should not be bound by these five considerations.42 But the Daubertguidelines still provide a useful benchmark against
which courts can measure proposed expert testimony. Unfortunately, however, some attorneys will employ the Daubertcriteria as though they must be
met in their entirety. More importantly, some trial judges may view Daubert
as providing a five-prong blueprint for determining admissibility rather than
as providing possible methods of evaluating admissibility. In effect, the
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 593.
Id.
Id. at 594 (citing United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348,353-54 (7th Cir. 1989)).
Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194,1198 (2d Cir. 1978)).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,1238 (3d Cir. 1985)).
See id. at 593 (noting that "[m]any factors will bear on the inquiry" and that Court

does not "presume to set out a definitive checklist or test").
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Supreme Court's suggested criteria become the sole criteria. Hopefully, however, the lower courts will sensibly consider the Supreme Court's guidelines
and focus on those factors that are appropriate given the discipline and the
particular issue at hand. One would expect that continuing experience with
Daubertchallenges and appeals will lead to a clearer picture ofthe boundaries
for admissible evidence in a variety of disciplines and contexts.
C. The Kumho Clarification
The focus in Daubert was on scientific evidence. The Court thus left
open the question of whether the ruling equally applied to non-scientific
expert evidence. The Supreme Court's decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael addressed this question.43
InKumho, the plaintiffs filed a products liability suit against a tire manufacturer and a tire distributor.' They alleged that a defect inthe production of
one of the plaintiffs' tires caused a blowout that consequently resulted in the
death of one passenger and injuries to the other passengers." The plaintiffs'
allegation relied heavily upon the expert testimony of an expert in tire failure
analysis.46 Kumho Tire made amotionto exclude the expert's testimony onthe
grounds that the methodology employed did not meet the reliability requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.47 The district court, relying upon
Daubert, agreed that it should serve as a "gatekeeper" in determining the
reliability of the proposed expert evidence.' The district court measured the
evidence offered bytheplaintiffs' expert againsttheDaubert criteria and found
that the expert's methods came up short.49 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the lower court's decision because "'the Supreme Court 5in0
Daubertexplicitly limited its holding to cover only the "scientific context.""'
43. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (concluding that
Daubert gatekeeping obligation applies to non-scientific testimony).

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
1996).

Id. at 142.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 145.
Id. (citing Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1514, 1521-22 (SD. Ala.

49. See id. at 146 (noting that all factors weighed against reliability of methods). The
plaintiffs subsequently requested reconsideration by the district court on the grounds that it had
interpreted Dauberttoo rigidly. Id. The court granted the motion and agreed that the Daubert

application is a flexible one. But after further consideration, the court still found that the
plaintiffs' expert methodology was not sufficiently reliable. Id.

50.
1997)).

See id4 (quoting Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433,1435-36 (1lth Cir.
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The issue that Kumho subsequently brought before the Supreme Court
was whether Daubert applied to testimony that is not considered "scientific"
in nature. 51 In other words, does Daubert equally apply to the "technical" or
"other speiaized" branches of knowledge referred to in the Federal Rules of
Evidence?52 In answering that question, the Supreme Court indicated that
Daubertdoes apply to forms of knowledge other than those characterized as
"scientific." More specifically, the Court found that "it is the Rule's word
'knowledge,' not the words (like 'scientific') that modify that word, that
'establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. "'
53
Unfortunately, the Kumho decision also may inadvertently have created
confusion over this reliability standard. The DaubertCourt made it clear that
the admissibility of evidence is to be determined by focusing only on the
reliability of the expert's methodology and not on the expert's conclusions:
"The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on
the conclusions that they generate."54 Some legal scholars have interpreted the
Court's statement to suggest that courts should only evaluate the expert's
methodology and should not evaluate the application of that methodology to
the particular facts of a case."5 But in Kumho, the Supreme Court suggested
that reliability is appropriately determined not only by examining the underlying methodology, but also by examining how that methodology is employed
with respect to the particular facts of a case: "In sum, Rule 702 grants the
district judge the discretionary authority... to determine reliability in light
of the particularfacts and circumstances of the particularcase."'' Thus, it
is by no means clear at what point the line is to be drawn between evaluating
the admissibility of expert testimony under Daubert and evaluating the
sufficiency of that testimony through summary judgment procedures.5
51.

Id. at 146-47.

52. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (addressing expert testimony and referring to "scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge").
53. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,147 (1999) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,589-90 (1993)).
54. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
55. See, e.g., Gavil, supra note 6, at 676-77. Gavil stated:
[T]he Court's admonition in Daubert that Rule 702 is concerned solely with the

objective reliability of the "technique" or "methodology" employed by the expert,
not his application of the technique to the particular facts of a given case ....
Daubert could not have more unambiguously emphasized that the focus of Rule

702 is on technique and methodology, not application.
Id (citingDaubert, 509 U.S. at 595).
56. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 158 (emphasis added).
for a more detailed discussion of these issues. For additional per57. See infra Part MII
spectives, see generallyAREEDA &HOVENKAMP,supra note 6, and Gavil, supra note 6.
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InKumho, the Court also reaffirmed the role of the trial judge as a
"gatekeeper" in determining the admissibility of expert evidence regardless of
whether the evidence is scientific in nature or otherwise. 58 In addition, the
Court addressed the role of the five Daubertconsiderations in cases dealing
with expert testimony that is not "scientific."59' The Court affirmed that these
factors may be considered, but that such application will depend on "the
nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his
testimony."' The Court noted that the considerations outlined in Daubert
were intended "to be helpful, not definitive" and further observed that '"hose
factors do not all necessarily apply even in every instance in which the reliability of scientific testimony is challenged." 6' Nonetheless, the Court maintained that the primary role of the gatekeeper is to ensure that an expert
"employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field."'62
D. Implicationsof the "Gatekeeper"Role
The Supreme Court decisions in Daubert and Kumho assigned a
gatekeeping role to federal judges in determining the admissibility of expert
evidence. As Areeda and Hovenkamp noted, this assignment has been criticized by judges who do not relish evaluating expertise in areas in which they
are not experts. 6' For example, Judge Kozinski, the Ninth Circuit judge who
revisited Dauberton remand, stated:
As we readthe Supreme Court's teachinginDaubert, therefore, thoughwe
are largely untrained in science and certainly no match for any of the
witnesses whose testimony we are reviewing, it is our responsibility to
determine whether those experts' proposed testimony amounts to "scientific knowledge," constitutes "good science," and was "derived by the
scientific method."... Our responsibility, then,... is to resolve disputes
amongrespected, well-credentialedscientistsaboutmatterssquarelywithin
their expertise...."
58.
mony).
59.
60.

See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141 (ruling that Daubertanalysis applies to all expert testiSee id. (concluding that trial judge may consider more specific factors).
Id. at 150 (quoting Solicitor General, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at

19).
61. Id.at 151.
62. Id. at 152. In Part IV, infra, we return to this standard and provide an example of
what this means for economists.
63. See AREEDA & HOVENKAsupra note 6, at 322.1c. nn.82-87 and accompanying
text (discussing problems with requiring judge to engage in economists' vocabulary).
64.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311,1315 (9th Cir. 1995).
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It is debatable whether Daubert obligates federal judges to resolve all disagreements among expert witnesses offering testimony on opposite sides of
a legal dispute. Indeed, the Daubert Court emphasized the flexibility of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in admitting expert testimonyYI Clearly, however,
the Court expected federal judges to determine whether expert witnesses bring
to the courtroom analytical integrity that reflects '"the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field."I
Having said this, however, Judge Kozinski's point is well-taken.6 7 Depending
on the nature of the case and the issues being challenged onDaubertgrounds,
a judge who lacks experience in the relevant field may find it difficult to
adequately assess the quality and the appropriateness of the methodology
employed or whether the approach is one in which experts might reasonably
disagree.
For example, when one considers the passionate and heated academic
disputes that exist among well-respected economists regarding the appropriate analysis of some subjects, the expectation that non-economists - even
federal judges - could determine whether the methodology in question is
acceptable may be quite imposing. In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a
partial dissent in Daubert, questioned the wisdom of the Court's offering
suggestions for assessing the "reliability" of expert testimony.' Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissent specifically noted that many of the issues the Court
addressed in Daubert dealt with "definitions of scientific knowledge, scientific method, scientific validity, and peer review - in short, matters far afield
from the expertise of judges."'69 He further commented, "I do not doubt that
Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility in deciding
questions of the admissibility of proffered expert testimony. But I do not
think it imposes on them either the obligation or the authority to become
amateur scientists in order to perform that role." 7° Unfortunately, he offered
no helpful suggestions as to how judges could meet their responsibilities in
this regard.
65.

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,593 (1993) (acknowledging

that many factors will bear on inquiry).
66. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
67. See Daubert,43 F.3d at 1315 (questioning judge's ability to evaluate expert testimony); supra note 64 and accompanying text (quoting Judge Kozinsla).
68. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598-601 (Rehnquist, C.., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
69. Id. at 599 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). These issues
would appear to be far removed from the collective experience and training of most juries as
well.
70. Id. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But our
judicial system requires lay juries to perform this very task.
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Thus, two questions arise: How will judges deal with their gatekeeping
role, and what are the implications for challenges to expert testimony on
Daubert grounds? One approach that judges might adopt is to reject all
Daubert challenges if the testimony of the experts is relevant to the issue at
hand and if there are no obvious abuses of methodology - even if there is
significant disagreement between opposing experts. This approach puts the
issue in the jury's hands. One example ofthis approach is found inAllapattah
Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corp."
The issue in Allapattah focused on an alleged breach of contract by
Exxon against its dealers? 2 The claim centered around the "Discount for
Cash" Program implemented by Exxon in 1982.' As part of this program,
Exxon imposed a "credit card recovery fee" (CCR fee) that it collected from
its dealers. 4 The program also entailed a reduction in wholesale prices for
motor fuel.' The primary dispute was over the net effect of the reduction
in wholesale prices in combination with the credit card recovery fee. 6 The
plaintiffs argued that "Exxon 'took back' any reduction initially given, such
that the entire CCR fee subsequently charged are its damages."" The defendant disputed this claim, arguing that the wholesale price reductions more
than offset the CCR fees and, hence, there was no basis for the damages
claimed.7 8
Both the plaintiffs and the defendant employed economists to assess
damages (or lack thereof) and to offer expert testimony. 9 In due course, the
plaintiffs and the defendant challenged the reliability of the expert testimony
offered by the opposing expert on Daubertgrounds.8" The evidence offered
for the Dauberthearing itself was substantial." The evidence included the
original expert reports and various reply affidavits that addressed the claims
made by the expert on the opposite side ofthe case and that responded to challenges made bythe opposing expert regarding methodology and conclusions.'
71. 61 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
72. See Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1336 (S.D. Fla.
1999) (describing claim).

73.

Id.

74.

Id. at 1342.

75.

Id.

76.
77.

Id. at 1342-43.
Id. at 1342.

78.

Id.

79.
80.
81.

See id. at 1343-44 (explaining need for expert testimony).
See id. at 1337 (detailing exchange of motions filed).
See id. at 1341 n.1O (describing experts' filings and accompanying exhibits).

82.

Id.
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The Daubert hearing lasted six days.s 3 The district court found that both
experts were qualified and that their testimony "would assist the trier of fact
to determine whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to damages." '4 Thus, the
primary focus of this hearing was on the reliability of the methodologies
employed by the experts_ 5
A key issue that the experts focused on was whether "Exxon's wholesale
prices were below [or above] the average of its cash-basis competitors." 6
Despite relying on similar data and employing similar methodologies, the
experts reached "directly opposite conclusions.""1 Both experts relied on
Exxon price data, but they disagreed on the reliability of those data and how
to employ the data."s For example, the plaintiffs' expert argued that the data
were biased, whereas the defendant's expert claimed that they were not.89
Both experts employed "econometric and regression analyses," which "[g]enerally... are considered reliable disciplines."* But each side's expert disagreed with how the other side's expert employed the methodology. Under
attack were the "selection of data, choice of controls, and the like."9 1
After listening to the proposed testimony during the Dauberthearings,
the judge determined that each expert's testimony was sufficiently reliable to
meet admissibility criteria and that the concerns raised by each side went more
to the weight that should be given to the data and methodology employed,
rather than to reliability.92 Even though the two experts came to opposite
83.

Id.at 1342 n.13. In reviewing the expansive set ofmaterials, Judge Gold commented:

In their final arguments, and during the course of the six day Daubert hearing, each

party raised innumerable challenges to validity of each expert's use of data, assumption and methodology. To listen to the parties, both experts, who have spent

years preparing their testimony, did nothing reliable, credible or worthy of further
review by the fact finder.

Id.
84. Id. at 1338.
85. See id. ("The sole remaining issue for determination is... whether the [experts']
methodologies... are sufficiently reliable for consideration by the jury.")
86. Id. at 1347.
87. Id.
88. See id.at 1346-53 (applying Daubertfactors to each expert's opinions).
89. See id. at 1347-48 (describing documented errors).
90. Id. at 1347 (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 1350.
92. In evaluating the various challenges to each expert's testimony, Judge Gold opined
that the questions raised by the opposing side were more appropriately directed to the weight
that the testimony should be afforded, rather than to the reliability. See, e.g., id. at 1344 n.19
("The court concludes that the use of the data by each expert as part of their [sic] methodology,
is sufficiently reliable. The weight to be given to the data, and its use by each expert, shall be
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conclusions, the judge decided that "[n]one of the methodologies employed,
or choice of data utilized, was based solely on guesswork, speculation or
conjecture."' The court also opined:
[It is not a districtjudge's function at a Dauberthearing to determine that
the expert's testimony was irrefutable or certainly correct. It is sufficient
that each expert's reasoning and methodology had a reliable foundation in
the knowledge and experience of his discipline, regardless of claimed
errors of interpretation. ... In sum, the opinions of both experts are well
within the range where experts may honestly differ, and where the jury
must decide among their competing points ofview.94
The district court in Allapattah questioned how courts should deal with
instances in which there are two well-qualified experts, each employing standard methodologies, but arriving at opposite conclusions and challenging one
another's methodologies.9' Judge Gold clearly expressed his concern that a
judge would deem an expert's opinion unreliable "[mierely because two qualified experts reach directly opposite conclusions using similar, ifnot identical,
data bases, or disagree over which data to use or the manner in which the data
should be evaluated."96 Moreover, Judge Gold opined, "Daubertdoes not
empower the district judge to simply 'pick' one expert over the other...
under the guise of exercising the gatekeeping function. To do so would
improperly usurp the jury's function." ' Judge Gold's concern is well-taken,
especially in cases "where striking the expert's testimony would effectively
end the case for the affected party.""
Thus, the judicial approach adopted in Allapattah ultimately leaves it up
to the jury to weigh conflicting and often complicated expert testimony and
to decide which expert's analysis seems more credible. This raises some
interesting issues. A judge may not feel adequately equipped to exclude
expert testimony because it relies on sophisticated techniques that fall outside
the judge's area of expertise. But is it fair to ask the jury to decide the validity
of those techniques if the judge feels unable to do so? The district court in
Allapattahopined that "[m]erely because it may be hard for the jury to understand the competing methodologies does not mean that the right to jury trial
left for the jury."); id. at 1348 n.24 ("The court finds this argument goes more to weight than

reliability."); id. at 1350 n31 ("[M]uch of Exxon's attack goes more to weight rather than to
reliability."); id.at 1353 ("It goes way beyond reliability and into weight").
93. See id.at 1353 (concluding that each expert's testimonywas reliable).
94. Id.at 1354.
95. See id.at 1345,1352,1353 (discussing experts' conclusions).
96. Id.at 1341.

97.

Id.

98.

Id.at 1342.
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should be denied and the matter decided de facto by the court."' Moreover,
one could argue that skilled cross-examination will reveal weaknesses in
methodology and in the resulting conclusions that are drawn."° But one must
also keep in mind that "[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite
misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it.""0' Accordingly, federal
judges should be ever vigilant to ensure the quality ofthe evidence they admit.
LII. Daubert ChallengesandSummary Judgment
In the presence of uncertainty regarding which expert's technique is
"correct," ajudge legitimately may be unwilling to tip the balance in one side's
favor during a Dauberthearing. Ajudge may be especially concerned ifthere
is any potential merit in the expert testimony on either side of a dispute. Thus,
the appropriate judicial response may be to allow both sides to be heard and to
subject expert testimony to further evaluation. This approach may be acceptable because summary judgment provides another opportunity to examine
expert testimony.
Much of the screening of expert testimony in antitrust cases may occur
during summary judgment proceedings. Although the demarcation between
expert testimony that judges should exclude on Daubertgrounds and expert
testimony that judges should exclude through summary judgment is not
precise, it is useful to identify the distinguishing features of these two approaches for scrutinizing expert testimony. °2 First, as Areeda and Hovenkamp observed, there is a procedural difference. 3 Expert testimony that a
court excludes under Daubertis "not entitled to be considered at all, and thus
is not part ofthe case's record," whereas "when a court considers a motion for
summary judgment it examines the entire record, and expert testimony that
has not been excluded is in the record."'0° Thus, expert testimony that a court
does not exclude is subsequently available to support either side's assertion,
whereas testimony that a court does exclude may not be considered at all."'
Of course, if the expert testimony rests upon suspect theoretical foundations
99. Id. (citation omitted).
100. The DaubertCourt noted that "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instructiori on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579,596 (1993) (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.. 44,61 (1987)).
101. Id. at 595 (quoting Weinstein, Rule 702 of the FederalRules ofEvidence ls Sound
It ShouldNotBeAmended, 138 F.R.D. 631,632 (1991)).
102. See generaltyAREEDA & HOVENKMAA, supra note 6; Gavil, supranote 6.
103. AREEDA & HOVENKAP, supra note 6, at 322.1a.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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or suspect empirical methodologies, then one would not want such evidence
to factor into any subsequent considerations regardless of whose side the
testimony supports.
The second distinction is more substantive. Daubert indicates that
although the reliability and relevancy of an expert's methodology are subject
to scrutiny, the conclusions drawn from that methodology are not."° Thus, a
Daubert challenge would focus on the expert's methodology and not on the
associated conclusions. This suggests that courts may admit expert testimony
ifthe methodology is relevant and reliable, but subsequently accord no weight
to that same testimony in the summary judgment process. For example,
regression analysis is a statistical tool that underlies econometrics, which is
a staple of all graduate programs in economics. This would seemto say, then,
that courts would admit expert testimony that is based on a standard regression model because the methodology is generally accepted.' ° If the expert
employed this methodology in an unreliable way, the challenge would come
at the summaryjudgment stage. Areeda and Hovenkamp observed:
[A] motionfor summayjudgementwhere the relevant economictestimony
has not been excluded presumes that the economist's methodology is
acceptable but thatthe conclusions donotfollow, are not appropriate to the
facts of the case, demonstrate that there is no "issue of material fact," or
draw a factual conclusion that is impermissible as a matter of law."
While there are certainly instances in which it is reasonable for a fact
finder to separately evaluate an expert's methodology and the associated
conclusions, Daubert'slanguage that "[t ] he focus... must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate" is somewhat troubling, for it suggests that this distinction must always be made."°
In many cases, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the method106.

The Supreme Court, emphasizing the flexibility of Federal Rule of Evidence 702,

opined that the primary focus of Rule 702 "is the scientific validity - and thus the evidentiay
relevance and reliability - of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of
course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they
generate." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594-95 (1993); see also
AREEDA & HOVENKMP, supra note 6, at 322.1a (discussing judicial control of expert
testimony).
107. The district court inAllapattah indicated that "[g]enerally, econometric and regression
analyses are considered reliable disciplines." Allapattah Sers., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 F.
Supp. 2d 1335, 1347 (S.D. la. 1999) (citing City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chem, Inc., 158
F.3d 548, 566 (11th Cir. 1998); Askew v. City of Rome, 127 F.3d 1355, 1365 n.2 (11th Cir.
1997); Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir.
1993); Daniel L. Rubinfield, Economics in the Courtroom, 85 COL L. REV. 1084 (1985)).

108.
109.

ARA& HOVENKAMP,supra note 6, at 322.1a.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (emphasis added).
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ology from the conclusions because the conclusions are often dependent on
the methodology employed. Moreover, an examination ofthe conclusions that
follow from a particular methodology may reveal weaknesses in the methodology itself. If a purportedly reliable methodology leads to unreliable conclusions, this may suggest that the methodology really is not reliable - at least for
that particular application.
An illustrative example comes from health care economics. Specifically,
one theory that has enjoyed significant appeal, but has also generated signifi-

cant controversy in the health care economics literature, is "supplier-induced
demand." This theory posits that in response to an increase in supply, providers induce demand to offset the downward pressure on price that normally
accompanies increased supply. Well-respected economists can be found on
either side of the debate. Several sophisticated statistical techniques seem to
confirm the existence of supplier-induced demand. 1 But when Dranove and
Wehner employed these same statistical techniques to test the ridiculous
proposition that obstetricians induce the demand for childbirth, they found the
requisite "statistically significant" evidence!" Their results obviously cast
doubt on the reliability of the statistical techniques themselves - at least in
this particular application. That is, it is the absurdity of the conclusions that
follow from the methodology employed that casts doubt on the methodology
itself. Now, under a requirement that focuses "solely on methodology," one
would have to admit the evidence - because the statistical analysis employed
was "generally accepted" - despite the absurd conclusion that follows.
The point is that it is not always wise to focus only on the methodology
and to ignore the conclusions drawn. The two are interdependent pieces of an
expert's analysis; they are not mutually exclusive. To say that a trier of fact
should admit the expert testimony when the methodology appears to be
appropriate, but then grant it no weight under a summary judgment analysis
that correctly recognizes the absurdity of the conclusions that follow, renders
Daubertchallenges trivial and unnecessarily raises the costs of litigation.
Again, there may very well be cases in which a trier of fact would appropriately admit evidence based on the soundness of the methodology, but
subsequently grant summary judgment on the grounds that the same testimony
failed to establish an "issue of material fact." For example, the expert's testimony may rely on solid theoretical and empirical grounds, but simply provide
110. See SHERmANFOILANDETAL.,TIEECONOMICS oFHEALTHAND HEALTHCARE 16781 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing imperfect agency and supplier-induced demand); CHAPals PHELPS,
HEALTHEcONOMICS 245-50 (2d ed. 1997) (describing supplier-induced demand).
111. See David Dranove & Paul WehnerPhysician-InducedDemandfor Childbirths, 13
. HEALTH ECON. 61, 62 (1994) (urging abandonment of statistical technique because it leads

to absurd result).
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insufficient support for the conclusions drawn in the case at hand. In a similar
vein, Areeda and Hovenkamp observed that "[a] well-credentialed but honest
economic expert hired by the plaintiff may concede major points in the defendant's favor."112 But failing to recognize those instances in which the methodology and the conclusions generated are inextricably intertwined will lead to
meaningless distinctions that waste both time and money.
IV Inferences of Collusion andDaubert Challenges
We now turn to an area of antitrust in which expert testimony may be
particularly affected by Daubertchallenges: inferences of collusion based on
economic evidence. A distinguishing feature of this area of antitrust is the
reliance on circumstantial evidence due to a lack of direct evidence. Economic
experts are often called upon to testify about that circumstantial evidence.
For example, in many price fixing cases there is no direct evidence of
collusion. Plaintiffs, therefore, must rely on circumstantial evidence to

establish illicit collaboration among their suppliers. In so doing, one must
distinguish between tacit collusion," 3 which is not illegal, from an overt but
clandestine conspiracy, which is illegal. In many instances, whatever circumstantial evidence exists is interpreted by economists and becomes the focus of
expert testimony. Daubert and Kumho teach us that the economic expert
should apply the same level of intellectual rigor to litigation support as he or
she does to professional writing and teaching." 4 This would seem to expand
the grounds for challenge beyond the reliability of the methodology itself to
112.
113.

HOVENKAMP,supra note 6,at 322.1a.
In Clamp-All Corp. v. CastIron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478 (1st Cir. 1988), then
AREEDA&

Judge Breyer addressed tacit collusion:
Courts have noted that the Sherman Act prohibits agreements,and they have almost
uniformly held, at least in the pricing area, that such individual pricing decisions
(even when each firm rests its own decision upon its belief that competitors will do
the same) do not constitute an unlawful agreement under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
That is not because such pricing is desirable (it is not), but because it is close to
impossible to devise a judicially enforceable remedy for "interdependent" pricing.
How does one order a firm to set its prices without regardto the likely reactions of
its competitors?

Id. at 484 (citations omitted).
114. For example, the DaubertCourt noted that implicit in the Federal Rules of Evidence
is the "assumption that the expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and
experience of his discipline." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)
(emphasis added). In Kumho, the Court maintained that the primary role of the gatekeeper is
to ensure that an expert "employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field." Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137,152 (1999).
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include the application of that methodology. It is not entirely clear when
unreliable expert testimony should be deemed inadmissible under Daubertand
when it should be deemed admissible under Daubert, but insufficient to
survive a summary judgment motion. Although we do not hope to clarify this
issue here, we will illustrate our own views by examining the proposed expert

testimony in City ofTuscaloosa v. HarcrosChemical, Inc.," 5 which involved
allegations of an illegal conspiracy to fix prices." 6
A. Tacit Collusion

The idea of tacit collusion can be traced to the insights of Edward
Chamberlin." 7 He began by showing that the classic duopoly models" 8 of
Cournot" 9 and Bertrand 2 ' produced very different results depending upon the
assumptions. 2' Counot assumed that the firms would compete on quantity.
In doing so, each seller would believe that the quantity supplied by the other
was constant. The result was a price-quantity outcome that was in between
the competitive and the monopoly outcomes. Bertrand objected by claiming
that the firms would compete on price - not on quantity. In doing so, each
seller would assume that the price of the other would remain constant. This
altered assumption led the duopolists to produce the competitive result. Thus,
with only two firms, we would enjoy the benefits of competitive pricing,
which results in competitive output as well.
Chamberlin pointed out that the behavioral assumptions of the Coumot
and Bertrand models are extreme. 122 Specifically, the assumption that each
firm acts as though its competitors will not adjust quantity (price) in response
to its own quantity (price) adjustments is unrealistic.1' Thus, Chamberlin
115. 877F. Supp. 1504(N.D.Ala. 1995).
116. See City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chem., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1504, 1509 (NJ). Ala.
1995) (alleging price fixing conspiracy), rev'd,158 F.3d 548 (1lth Cir. 1998).
117. EDWARD H. CHAMBMERuN, THE THEORY OF MONoPOLIsTIc COMPETITION; A REORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE 46-55 (8th ed. 1962).
118. A duopoly is a market with only two sellers. See id. at 31 (discussing duopoly and

oligopoly).
119.

AuGUSTrNA. COURNOT, RECHMRCHES

SUR IS

PRINCEPES MAM

TIQUES DE LA

T)oPiE DES R CHESSES, Ch. VII (1838).
120.

. Bertrand presented the Bertrand model in a book review of Cournot's work pub-

lished in 67 JOURNALDEs SAVANTS 499 (1883).
121. Modem treatments are available in standard textbooks. See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLoFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 153-93 (3d ed. 1999)
(discussing noncooperative oligopoly).
122. CHAMBERlIN, supra note 117,at46-55.
123. See id. at 46-47 (explaining how seller takes account of his total influence on price).
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imbued his duopolists with some intelligence. In particular, he allowed them
to fully recognize their mutual interdependence.2 Although the firms behave
independently, they do not compete as though their profit functions were independent." Instead, each firm acts independently while taking into account
both direct and indirect consequences of any price or output decision.126 From
this foundation, Chamberlin argued that a former monopolist would accommodate the entry of a second firm.' Instead of fighting it out in the market,
the incumbent would reduce its output to one-half of the monopoly level,
thereby making room for the entrant to produce the other half." In this way,
each firm would earn one-half of the monopoly profit, which is more than
one-half of any other profit.'1 The entrant also recognizes the advantages of
this outcome and does not get greedy, i.e, it does not produce more than its
"fair share." Chamberlin characterized this outcome as having occurred in
"the absence of agreement or of 'tacit' agreement."' 3 °
The theoretical problem with the Chamberlin solution is that it invokes
dynamic considerations in a static fiamework. In a static model, there is no
reason for the incumbent (or the entrant) to restrain its greed. The rationale
for restraint is not based on profit maximization until one invokes dynamic
considerations. Chamberlin, of course, understood this, but our modeling
skills were underdeveloped at the time. A more modem approach employs
the theory of repeated games to confirm that the Chamberlin solution is a
possible outcome when the number of periods is infinite or when it is finite,
but of unknown magnitude."' In such cases, the gains from deviating from
the shared monopoly solution are- outweighed (under all plausible circumstances) by the losses that the resulting competition would impose. Interestingly, such repeated games have a multiplicity of outcomes. Although our
intuition may be that the shared monopoly solution is more likely than any
other, game theory suggests that other noncompetitive - albeit noncolusive outcomes are possible.'
124.

Id.

125.

Id. at 47.

126.
127.

See id. (explaining how sellers consider indirect consequences oftheir moves).
See id. (providing example to illustrate advantages to seller).

128.

Id.

129.

See id. (noting that price is perfectly stable).

130.

Id.

131.

CARLTON& PERLOFF, supra note 121, at 175-83.

132.

When a game is repeated an infinite number of times and there is no discounting of

the future, an infinite number of outcomes are possible. In the oligopoly context, this means
that all price-output combinations are possible between the competitive and the monopolistic.
See CARLTON &PMRLOFF, supra note 121, at 183 (discussing oligopoly context).
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This recognition of mutual interdependence and the stable, noncompetitive outcome associated with it have come to be known as tacit collusion, an
obvious contradiction in terms. When economists speak of tacit collusion,
they are referring to instances in which noncompetitive, if not monopolistic,
prices are charged absent explicit collusion. In other words, there are no
"smoke-filled rooms," e-mail exchanges, or cell phone conferences. In anti-

trust circles, the jargon is "conscious parallelism." 133

B. The AntitrustEnforcement Dilemma
Section 1 ofthe ShermanAct forbids contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade." 4 The case law is fairly clear that proof of agreement is necessary for a violation to occur. 35 In a case of tacit collusion,
however, there is no agreement by definition. Recall that in Chamberlin's

duopoly model the incumbent monopolist recognized that accommodating an
entrant would be more profitable than fighting. 3 6 The entrant did not abuse

the incumbent's hospitality, and both enjoyed the benefits ofjoint profit maximization. There was no agreement, and as a result, there can be no successful

antitrust prosecution. 37 No doubt, this is a source of frustration for antitrust

enforcers as well as for consumers. But the fact remains that absent proof of

some illegal agreement, there is no antitrust violation.'
133. See Donald F. Turner, The Definition ofAgreement Under the Sherman AcL ConsciousParallelismand Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 663-81 (1962) (discussing
whether term "agreement" includes consciously parallel action and refusals to deal).
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1998).
135. Even the dissent in Blomkest Fertilizer,Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, Inc.
acknowledged that "interdependent pricing that occurs with no actual agreement does not
violate the Sherman Act, for the very good reason that we cannot order sellers to make their
decisions without taking into account the reactions of their competitors." Blomkest Fertilizer,
Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, Inc., 203 F.3d 1028, 1042 (8th Cir. 2000) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting).
136. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (describing situation in which incumbent would not fight).
137. Much of what we know about tacit collusion has been summarized in the following
articles written for a symposium on tacit collusion. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Two
ShermanActSection 1 Dilemmas: ParalleMPricing,the OligopolyProblem,andContemporary
Economic Theory, 38 ANrmWUST BULL. 143 (1993); William E. Kovacic, The Identificationand
Proofof HorizontalAgreements Under the Antitrust Laws, 38 ANTRMUST BUIL. 5 (1993);
Dennis A. Yao & Susan S. DeSanti, Game Theory and the LegalAnasisof Tacit Collusion,
38ANTITRUSTBULL. 113 (1993).
138. The Supreme Court characterized conscious parallelism as a process "not in itself
unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power,
setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared
economic interests." See Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 227 (1993) (addressing allegation of tacit collusion).
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C. Introducing "PlusFactors"
Although tacit collusion, or conscious parallelism, is beyond the reach
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, that does not mean that antitrust enforcers
need direct evidence of an agreement. If the defendants have been careful,
there will usually be no direct evidence of conspiracy. In fact, in Section 1
cases, "[o]nly rarely will there be direct evidence of an express agreement."' 3 9
As a result, a plaintiff is entitled to introduce circumstantial evidence of
collusion. In United States v. Washington, 40 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals explained the need for circumstantial evidence: "By its nature conspiracy is conceived and carried out clandestinely, and direct evidence of the
crime is rarely available. Thus, circumstantial evidence from which the jury
could reasonably infer the existence of an agreement is permissible.' 41 Of
course, defendants may rebut circumstantial evidence by presenting proof that
there was an independent business justification for the suspect behavior. It is
not uncommon to point to parallel business behavior - stable, noncompetitive
pricing - and add to that other evidence that implies the existence of an
explicit, albeit clandestine, agreement: 4 2 A classic example is provided by the
Supreme Court's decision inInterstateCircuit,Inc. v. UnitedStates. 43 Inthat
case, a large exhibitor of movies asked eight major distributors to change the
terms of their contracts with the exhibitor's rivals.'4 The requested changes
were clearly anticompetitive because they prevented the rival exhibitors from
competing on price or quality. The letter sent out to the distributors by the
exhibitor included all of the distributors as addressees; thus, each distributor
knew that the defendant asked the other distributors to behave in the same
manner. 4 ' Based on the offer and the parallel acceptance of the terms, the
Court found that there was sufficient evidence to permit an inference of an
actual agreement.'46 This was not a case in which the Court used the antitrust
laws to challenge tacit collusion. Rather, this was an instance in which the
Court relied on circumstantial evidence to infer the existence of an express
agreement. 47 As a result, plaintiffs have searched for so-called plus factors other facts and circumstances - that supplement evidence of parallel behavior
139. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,720 (1965).
140. 586 F.d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978).
141. UnitedStatesv.Washington,586F.2d 1147,1153 (7thCir. 1978).
142. See RoGER D. BLAIR &DAvD L. KmERmAN, ANUIRUST EcoNoMIcs 206 (1985)
(listing types of evidence recognized by Richard Posner).
143. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).

144.

Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208,215-17 (1939).

145.
146.
147.

Id. at222.
See id. at 221-27 (examining alleged conspirators' course of conduct).
See id. at 225 (recognizing that circumstances justify inference of concerted action).
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to form the foundation for an inference of conspiracy. " The most compelling
plus factors are "those that tend to show that the conduct would be in the
parties' self-interest if all acted in the same way but would be contrary to their
self-interest if they acted alone.!"'49 Nonetheless, one must still be able to infer
that the decision to act in a certain way was not arrived at unilaterally.
The Supreme Court has provided some guidance in this search for plus
factors. First, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,"0 the Court explained:
The correct standard is that there must be evidence that tends to exclude
the possibility of independent action by the [defendants]. That is, there
must be direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove
that [the defendants] had a conscious commitment to a common scheme
designed to achieve an unlawful objective.151
Second, in MatsushitaElectric Industries Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.," the
Supreme Court cautioned that there are limits to the inferences that one is permitted to draw from circumstantial evidence:
[A]ntitrust law limits the range ofpernissible inferences from ambiguous
evidence in a § 1 case. Thus ... conduct as consistent with permissible
competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an
inference of antitrust conspiracy.... To survive a motion for summary
judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff... must present evidence
"that tends to exclude the possibility" that the alleged conspirators acted
independently .... [I]n other words, [the plaintiff] must show that the
inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inference
of independent action ....

13

Overall, an economic expert must be cautious in areas of antitrust law, such
as collusion, that rely more heavily on circumstantial evidence than direct
148. See, e.g., Petruzzi'sIGA Supermarkets v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224,1232
(3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that "in a conscious parallelism case, a plaintiff also must demonstrate the existence of certain 'plus' factors, for only when these additional factors are present
does the evidence tend to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted independently"
(citing In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238,304 (3d Cir. 1983))).
149. See ABAANTITRUST SECTION, ANITrRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 10 (4th ed. 1997)
(discussing inferences of agreement among competitors) (citations omitted). This prescription
is not economically sound. As we noted above, in an oligopolistic repeated game contest, the
noncooperative (noncollusive) equilibria depend on a belief by each finn that the other firms
will behave accordingly. Thus, this observation does not support an inference of collusion.
150. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
151. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752,768 (1984).
152. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
153. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 578 (1986)
(concluding that appellate court failed to apply proper standards) (citations omitted).
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evidence. Because such evidence is particularly susceptible to Daubertchallenges, he or she is well-advised to take care in drawing inferences from
ambiguous evidence."M
In searching for circumstantial evidence, one should not confuse quantity
with quality. Amassing great quantities of ambiguous evidence does not
resolve the ambiguity simply because there is a lot of it. Consider the following six pieces of evidence regarding a student at the University of Florida
named Chris:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Chris is a law student.
Chris is white.
Chris has brown hair.
Chris jogs three times a week.
Chris majored in political science as an undergraduate.

6. Chris loves pizza.
Is Chris male or female? The evidence - individually and collectively - is
ambiguous with respect to this question. Adding more ambiguous evidence
does not resolve the matter. If every fact that we add is equally consistent with
Chris's being male and being female, there is no foundation for inferring either
gender. The same is true of economic evidence. If each piece is equally consistent with competition and collusion, the collection of evidence is ambiguous
and will not support an inference of collusion underMatsushita.
D. City of Tuscaloosa: An Example
55
The expert testimony in City of Tuscaloosav. HarcrosChemical,Inc.1
provides agood example.5 6 In CityofTuscaloosa,theplaintiffs allegedthatthe
suppliers of chlorine for water treatment had engaged in an illegal bid-rigging
scheme.15 7 There was no evidence of an explicit agreement; therefore, the
plaintiffs relied upon the testimony of an economist and a statistician to interpret circumstantial evidence. The trial court found their testimony wanting.'
154. See Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, Inc., 203 F3d 1028,
1033 (8th Cir. 2000) (rejecting ambiguous circumstantial evidence).
155. 877 F. Supp. 1504 (N-D. Ala. 1995).
156. See City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chem-, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1504, 1513 (N.D. Ala.
1995) (ideniffying experts), rev'd, 158 F.3d 548 (11th Cir. 1998). To the extent that it is
relevant, Roger D.Blair served as an expert for one of the defendants. For additional commentaries on the use of Daubertin City ofTuscaloosa, see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 6

at 322.1b and Gavil, supra note 6, at 673-78.
157. Bid rigging is a form of horizontal price fixing and, therefore, is illegal per se. United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392,398 (1927).

158.

The testimony ofthe statisticianwas stricken onDaubertgrounds. See CityofTusca-
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The economic analysis began with the market structure, a sound methodological beginning. It is widely recognized that certain structural conditions
are conducive to collusion. 9 These conditions are (1) few sellers, (2) homogeneous products, (3) sealed-bid contracts, and (4) inelastic demand at competitive prices."6 In the Alabama chlorine market, all ofthese conditions were
present. This, of course, does not mean that collusion is inevitable. In fact,
we do not have any empirical evidence on the frequency of collusion when
these structural conditions are present.
Standing alone, the structural conditions and the existence of parallel
business behavior will not support an inference of collusion. Those very same
structural conditions make it more likely that tacit collusion (or conscious
parallelism) may occur. That is, these structural conditions reduce the need
for explicit agreements. It is disingenuous for an economist to comment that
the observed firm behavior is "noncompetitive." Of course, it is noncompetitive. What would one expect? Ifthere are a handful of firms in a market, one
cannot expect them to behave as though there were fifty firms.
Following Monsanto, to distinguish noncollusive oligopolistic pricing
from collusive behavior, we look for "plus factors" that presumably will tend
to exclude the possibility of independent action." In City of Tuscaloosa,the
plaintiffs' expert examined certain business practices that he interpreted as
supporting an inference of explicit collusion. 62 This is where the analysis
began to founder. An economic interpretation of circumstantial evidence
should proceed on the basis of economic principles. The expert should
identify those actions that are clearly inconsistent with unilateral behavior and
count those as legitimate "plus factors." Evidence that is ambiguous should
be set aside. Trying to determine whether analytical breakdowns are due to
faulty methodology or to the unreliable application of sound methodology can
loosa, 877 F. Supp. at 1532 (striking testimony because it was unreliable). The economist's
testimony was not explicitly stricken, but it was severely criticized. See id. 1530-32 (discussing
problems with economist's testimony). The grant of summary judgment was based largely on
the court's rejection of this testimony as being admissible. The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and admonished the district court that it had confused admissibility under

Daubert with sufficiency of the evidence to survive summaryjudgment See City of Tuscaloosa
v. Harcros Chem., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 564 (11th Cir. 1998) (reversing lower court).
159. See George A. Hay & Daniel KelleyAn Empirical Survey ofPrice Fiing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. & ECON. 13, 18 (1994) (analyzing all price fixing cases filed and won between
January 1963 and December 1972).
160. See BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 142, at 151-52 (discussing empirical evidence
of conditions conducive to collusion).
161. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Sere. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (requiring

evidence tending to exclude possibility of independent action).
162. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chem., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1504, 1513-16 (N.D. Ala.
1995), rev'd, 158 F3d 548 (11th Cir. 1998).

IMPLICATIONS OFDAUBERT FOR ECONOMICEVIDENCE

825

be problematic. If an economist professes to be employing the theory of
oligopoly, which certainly is sound methodology, but concludes that ambiguous evidence indicates collusion, two alternatives are presented. On the one
hand, a faulty conception of oligopoly theory may have been used. This
would be unsound methodology and ripe for a Daubert challenge. On the
other hand, the oligopoly theory being employed may be sound, but it may be
applied in an unreliable way. It is difficult to distinguish between the two.
Fortunately, Daubert can catch one, and summary judgment can catch the
other.
First, the plaintiffs' expert in City of Tuscaloosa observed that the
marketing manager of one of the defendants communicated market intelligence to his own employees. 63 In the same memorandum, the manager
encouraged his salespeople to pursue profitable business and to try to improve
their margins."' Sales commissions are often based on total revenue rather
than profits. As a result, the sales representatives have an incentive to make
sales that might not be profitable to the firm. Reminding them that profitable
sales are important to the company is certainly no sign of collusion. Finally,
the memorandum encouraged the salespeople to gather market intelligence. 6 5
Now, this piece of evidence is not even ambiguous. If the defendants were,
in fact, colluding, it would make no sense to encourage the sales representatives to waste their time collecting market intelligence when they could be
working on selling
the product. It would be a real stretch to count this as a
"plus factor."''1
Second, plaintiffs' expert pointed to an "Exchange of Price Lists,"'167 but
there was no evidence of an actual exchange. Rather, one defendant had
acquired, in some unspecified way, a price list of a competitor. Evidence that
suppliers distribute price lists in advance of their effective dates and that such
price lists are collected as market intelligence by rivals is ambiguous at best.
Early price announcements may serve as signaling devices, but they also provide valuable information to customers for planning and budgeting purposes.
Again, the fact that market intelligence is being gathered is at least as consistent with competition as it is with collusion. Therefore, testimony to the contrary may be deemed unreliable.
163. See id.at 1513-16 (citing Robert F. Lanzillotti, Report on the Alabama Chlorine Litigation, May 20,1994, at 15).
164. Robert F. Lanzillotti, Report on the Alabama Chlorine Litigation, May 20, 1994, at
15 [hereinafter Lanzillotti Report].

165.

Id.

166. In the Lanzillotti Report, this episode is characterized as "A 'Meeting of the Minds,'"
but the marketing manager describes no "meeting ofthe minds." Id.

167.

Id. at 16.

57 WASH. & LEE L. REV 801 (2000)
Third, the plaintiffs' expert reviewed the deposition testimony of one
defendant who described how prices adjust in an oligopolistic market." The
defendant explained that price reductions are instantly communicated in the
market. This, of course, comes as no surprise in competitive, sealed-bid situations with public bid openings. All parties may attend the formal bid openings
and, therefore, will know immediately what everyone else bid. Although this
process may make price cuts less likely, the buyers are the ones who insist on
the process; it is not at the sellers' instigation.
The defendant also explained that price increases are tentative until there
is some assurance that market conditions have changed. This, too, is understandable because a premature price increase could lead to significant losses
in sales and profits. Thus, the defendant's explanation was fully consistent
with noncollusive oligopoly pricing. In essence, the chlorine suppliers would
try to raise prices through the sealed bids. Rivals would observe those tentative efforts to realize a higher price and, if conditions are right, the price will
move to a different level. No single frm is apt to just raise its price on all
business in the hope that it has correctly gauged the market without some
sense of how its rivals are apt to respond. The fact that a business executive
recognizes the mutual interdependence among a small group of rivals proves
no more than the fact that the defendant is not an idiot.
Fourth, the plaintiffs' expert examined another defendant's deposition
testimony and found that this defendant tried out some price increases with the
understanding that it would probably not Win169 According to the plaintiffs'
expert, submitting a bidthat was above the prevailing market price "was meant
1 70
to be an invitation to his other competitors to agree on a new market price.'
But, again, probing the market with tentative bids is a sensible pricing strategy
given the uncertainty surrounding the reactions of one's rivals. This may have
been a form of price leadership. In fact, there was some evidence that others
did follow or planned on following."' But absent an actual agreement to
follow the price leads of a designated driver in the market, this is not unlawful
oligopolistic behavior. 172 The fact that some firms follow the lead of others
could be the result of an agreement to do so, but it could also be a unilateral
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 16-18.
Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 18-19.

172. In United Statesv. InternationalHarvesterCo., the Supreme Court found no suppression of competition in unilateral decisions to follow the price lead of another. United States v.
Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1927) (explaining how competitors' independent
choices to follow prices does not show "sinister domination") (citations omitted); see also BLAIR
& KASERMAN, supranote 142, at 216-21 (examining four types ofprice leadership).
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decision on the part of each of the followers. Thus, this piece of evidence is
equally consistent with collusion and noncollusion and is ambiguous at best.
Fifth, the plaintiffs' expert observed one of the defendants "running a
price up the flagpole," presumably in an effort to encourage a general price
increase.' Again, however, this effort to move the market price is a unilateral one. There was no suggestion that this was collusive behavior; yet
without collusion, there is no violation. Clearly, this piece of evidence does
not provide a "plus factor" that establishes a foundation for an inference of

conspiracy.
The plaintiffs' expert expressed some concern for the fact that the
chlorine suppliers preferred to compete on service rather than on price.' 4 But
ifa conspiracy is to be successful, it must preventnonprice competition."5 He
also found something sinister in the fact that two of the defendants apparently
assigned sole responsibility for chlorine pricing to a single executive of each
company.176 Other than the fact that this cCentralized the chlorine pricing
decisions within these companies, plaintiffs' expert offered no reason why this
should be of any concern. Moreover, what would the remedy be? How could
a court insist that more than one executive at each firm be given pricing
authority?
Plaintiffs' expert also observed that the entry ofa newcomer disrupted the
prevailing pricing pattern.' This, however, is what one usually would expect
following entry.' As the supply capability increases, it is customary that
prices will fall. All that one observes is the movement from one oligopoly
equilibrium to another. None of these observations provide unambiguous
evidence of collusion; all of-this is at best ambiguous. As with our example of
Chris, the law student, no matter how much ambiguous evidence one amasses,
the collection remains ambiguous.
E. EvaluatingExpert Testimony
To evaluate expert testimony under Daubert,we must return to the two
overarching criteria articulated by the Supreme Court: reliability and rele173. Lanzillotti Report, supra note 164, at 19.
174. Id. at 18-20.
175. See George . Stigler, Price andNonprice Competition, 76 3. POL ECON. 149, 152
(1968) (explaining that nonprice competition will dissipate cartel profits).
176. Lanzillotti Report, supranote 164, at 9-10 n.6.
177. Id. at 21-24.

178. The fact that entry caused a disruption in the pricing pattern suggests thatthe firms did
not have the discipline that Chamberlin's oligopolists displayed. Chamberlinian oligopolists
would have accommodated the new entrant and everyone would have shared in the full monopoly profit. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text (concerning Chamberlin's analyses).
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vancy. The two inquiries are: (1) does the expert's testimony "have a reliable
basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline,"' 79 and (2) will the
testimony "'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue"'? 8 ' For cases requiring inferences of collusion, an economist
can assist the trier of fact in two basic ways. First, he or she can provide testimony on the structural conditions of the industry. Second, he or she can
analyze circumstantial evidence for its consistency or inconsistency with collusion.
Whether the economist's testimony actually will prove useful depends
upon its quality. We may examine two different situations in this regard.
First, an economist who aptly identifies legitimate "plus factors" will provide
information that assists the judge and jury in reaching the ultimate conclusion
on collusion. In this instance, it is unlikely that the experts testimony will be
stricken on Daubertgrounds.
The second case concerns ambiguous evidence. Expert testimony that
relies primarily on ambiguous evidence is more likely to be challenged under
Daubert. Because ambiguous evidence by its very nature is consistent with
both collusive and independent behavior, it is more difficult to know how a
court should deal with this type of testimony - especially ifDaubertmandates
that courts separate the expert's conclusions from his or her methodology.
One may reasonably argue that courts should exclude such testimony on
Daubertgrounds because ambiguous evidence is unlikely to assist the trier of
fact in determining the presence or absence of collusion. Moreover, admitting
ambiguous evidence may needlessly confuse and mislead the jury. On the
other hand, a judge may opt to admit such testimony on the grounds that it
may be bolstered later by the subsequent identification of direct evidence.'
Thus, a judge may find that it is more prudent to admit testimony based on
ambiguous evidence at the Daubert stage and then evaluate its reliability at
the summary judgment stage. Without more, courts will likely find testimony
that relies upon ambiguous evidence to be insufficient as support for an
inference of collusion. Consequently, a judge must weigh the potential, yet
unspecified, gains from admitting expert testimony that relies on ambiguous
evidence against the potential for that testimony to confuse the issue and mislead the jury.
179.
180.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,592 (1993).
Id. at 591 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 702).
See AREA & HoVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 322.1.b (arguing that "a potential

181.
problem of excluding the evidence in a case... is that direct evidence of conspiracy might later
emerge from a different source, and ... the expert testimony offered... could have been used
to bolster other, more explicit evidence of conspiracy obtained by witnesses to the events
themselves") (citation omitted).
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Returning to City of Tuscaloosa, one begins with arguably parallel business behavior. To move from that to an inference of collusion requires "plus
factors" that tend to exclude the possibility of independent behavior. It is not
enough to identify behavior that is consistent with noncollusive oligopolistic
behavior and inconsistent with the competitive behavior observed in a market
with fifty firms. After all, every standard textbook describes the differences
that one would expect to find absent collusion. In an oligopoly, one expects
the market participants to recognize the effects that their actions will have on
one another and to take the anticipated reaction(s) oftheir rivals into account
in deciding what to do. For example, ifA is selling to B at a noncompetitive
price, it may pay C to undercutA in the very short run. But C may recognize
that A could retaliate with low prices elsewhere. If C believes that, when the
dust settles, it will be worse off for having undercutA to acquire B's business,
C unilaterally may refrain from undercutting A.
From the perspective of consumer welfire, this result is unfortunate: The
price to B will be higher than it would be otherwise. But a higher price alone
does not make this behavior collusive. If one adds to this piece of ambiguous
evidence other evidence of conduct that rational oligopolists unilaterally
adopt, it does not create a "mosaic" that is larger than the sum of its parts.
There is no synergy- Ambiguous evidence is ambiguous no matter how much
of it there is. If an expert infers collusion from clearly ambiguous evidence,
he or she is asking for trouble. That trouble may come in the form of a
Daubert challenge or it may come in the form of summary judgment. Although there may be procedural differences between the two options, the end
result should be the same.
V ConcludingRemarks
Daubertmade it clear that the more flexible Federal Rules of Evidence
replaced the rigid Frye test for the admissibility of expert testimony. Presumably, admissibility was more difficult under Frye. But, before Daubert,there
were precious few challenges to the admissibility of expert testimony in antitrust cases. In an ironic twist, the heightened awareness raised by Daubert
actually has resulted in a plethora of challenges. Some challenges will succeed, and some will fail. In this way, we will discover the boundaries of both
Daubertand Kumho.
Daubertand Kumho also made it clear that the trial judge has a duty to
act as a gatekeeper and thus to shield the jury from expert testimony that will
not aid in its decision. There are costs and benefits of the resulting Daubert
challenges. There is no doubt that preparing for and participating in a Daubert
hearing is expensive for the parties. But there are also benefits to this process.
It provides the clearest possible picture of the testimony that will be given at
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trial; there can be no surprises. In addition, each side gets to see how the
direct and cross-examination will go for its own expert. This should make for
better trials.
Expert economic testimony should be based on a sound theoretical and/or
empircal methodology Moreover, the methodology should be reliably implemented by the expert. If it is not, then it should be excluded or accorded
no weight. If courts exclude such testimony on Daubertgrounds, there may
be no need for a summary judgment ruling. But courts that will admit unreliable testimony if it purportedly is based on a reliable methodology can reject
such testimony at the summary judgment stage. In either event, unreliable
expert testimony will not determine the outcome of the case. This is as it
should be.

